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thErE arE no SchoolS in utopia: John 
dEwEy’S dEmocratic Education
Ian T. E. Deweese-Boyd
A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glanc-
ing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always 
landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a 
better country, sets sail. Progress is the realization of Utopias.
(Oscar Wilde 2001, 141)
“The most utopian thing in Utopia is that there are no schools,” writes John Dewey 
(1933/1989, 136). With these words, Dewey opened his talk to kindergarten teach-
ers on April 21, 1933 at Teachers College, Columbia University. Published a couple 
days later in the New York Times under the title, “Dewey Outlines Utopian Schools,” 
we find Dewey in this little-discussed talk fancifully imagining himself among the 
Utopians—somehow transported from the economically depressed United States 
of the 1930s to Utopia, where the economy of acquisition is nothing but a memory.1 
Finding himself in Utopia, Dewey, of course, asks about the schools, quizzing the 
Utopians on everything from their pedagogy to their educational goals. What he 
discovers is a radical critique of education as it was (and still is) often practiced. 
The emphasis on standards and the competitive and punitive systems of examina-
tions that enforce them appear deeply misguided to the Utopians. They contend 
that it is our economic system and its emphasis on “personal acquisition and private 
possession” that has reduced education to the mere acquisition of facts, necessary 
for the further acquisition of things. According to the Utopians, once their acquisi-
tive economy had passed away, education itself was transformed, liberated in a way 
that enabled teachers to concentrate their attention on identifying and developing 
the unique capacities of each student. Instead of a single-minded focus on delivering the 
facts of the curriculum, the Utopians were able to see the child as the gravitational center 
of the educational enterprise.
The contemporary conversation about education in America, and in many 
other western educational contexts, could not be further from this vision. Ameri-
can society is more driven by acquisition than ever, and its children are exposed to 
an unprecedented onslaught of advertising aimed at training them in the practice of 
consumption.2 In school, the same children are scrutinized by high-stakes, standard-
ized examinations that stand as the goal and measure of learning. Education itself—in 
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the context of a consumption-oriented society— becomes a commodity among com-
modities. This situation, I argue, gives us good reason to consider Dewey’s Utopians 
and his own democratic prescription for educational and societal transformation.
After offering an overview of the Utopian’s educational vision, along with 
their understanding of the obstacles keeping schools from realizing this vision, I 
will examine the objection that the Utopians (and Dewey) naïvely reject the reality 
of economic motivation in learning. A consideration of Dewey’s own understanding 
of curriculum, vocation, and democracy—which underwrites the Utopian’s vision 
and critique—shows this objection to be largely misplaced. Far from overlooking the 
influence that economic motivation plays in education, Dewey sees that this motiva-
tion itself can be a threat to the attitudes necessary for truly democratic ways of living.
dEwEy’S outlinE for utopian SchoolS: thE ViSion
As Dewey’s first line suggests, there are no schools of the traditional sort in Utopia. With 
orchards, gardens, greenhouses, wilderness, workshops, kitchens, and chemistry labs, 
children are given ample space to encounter the realities of the world and to discover and 
pursue their particular interests. The classrooms themselves are open, flexible spaces that 
facilitate face-to-face interaction. Combined with a limit on size—less than two hundred 
pupils—these schools support the “close, intimate personal acquaintance” necessary for 
genuine engagement (Dewey 1933/1989, 135). Education itself is a sort of apprenticeship 
in which children work with adults and older peers, gradually taking on responsibilities 
commensurate with their developing capacities. Engaged in real occupations, working 
alongside masters—who “combine special knowledge of the children” with expertise in 
a certain area (Dewey 1933/1989, 137)—they encounter the content of what we call the 
curriculum in a context that gives it both meaning and point.3
At the center of Dewey’s utopian vision, or as he puts it, at the center of the 
Utopian’s vision of education, is the identification and cultivation of each child’s 
unique capacities. When he asks the Utopians about the objectives of their edu-
cational activities, he gets blank stares—they don’t understand the question; they 
don’t conceive of education as having measurable objectives like the meeting of 
standards. But, based on his observations, he reckons:
The fundamental purposes were thoroughly ingrained in the working of 
the activities themselves. In our language, [the objective] might be said to 
be the discovery of the aptitudes, the tastes, the abilities and the weaknesses 
of each boy and girl, and then to develop their positive capacities into at-
titudes and to arrange and reinforce the positive powers so as not to cover 
up the weak points but to offset them. (Dewey 1933/1989, 138)
Accordingly, Utopian educators seek “to find out what each individual person [has] 
in him from the beginning, and then devote themselves to finding out the condi-
tions of the environment and the kinds of activities in which the positive capaci-
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ties of each young person could operate most effectually” (139). Given an envi-
ronment in which to pursue their intrinsic interests and to exercise their growing 
capacities, Dewey’s Utopians argue, the process of learning is itself immediately 
enjoyable, not something simply to get through for the sake of some future joy. The 
attitude that sustains such learning is what Dewey calls a “positive sense of power,” 
a kind of confidence and pleasure in the exercise and growth of one’s capacities. 
This attitude, shaped and sustained by the educators and the school alike, involves 
the “elimination of fear, of embarrassment, of constraint, of self-consciousness; 
eliminat[ion, in short, of] the conditions which create . . . the feeling of failure and 
incapacity” (140). Equipped with the fortitude this sort of education grants them, 
these students emerge from their education ready and willing to do work that both 
matches their capacity and serves society; they will also be eager to discover and 
solve the problems that inevitably arise along the way. Accordingly, these students 
will be happy and capable in their work, and though he doesn’t mention it explic-
itly, Dewey implies that they will have developed the ability to identify the social 
conditions necessary to sustain their good work as well as that of their neighbors. 
According to Dewey’s Utopians, our schools (for now let’s assume a family re-
semblance) fall short of this ideal, because our acquisitive economic system has so in-
filtrated our consciousness that we find it difficult to see learning as anything but the 
acquisition and storing away of facts. The relentless drive to possess or consume extends 
to education by reducing knowledge to another commodity. Emphasis on getting this 
commodity, according to the Utopians, has the effect of displacing the work of “creat-
ing attitudes by shaping desires and developing needs that are significant in the process 
of living”—the central task of education in their view (1933/1989, 139). It isn’t simply 
that the schools don’t actively cultivate such attitudes, but that their goals and methods 
themselves create conditions that may well stifle them. For example, to ensure the ac-
quisition of the standards, schools employ “competitive methods of appeal to rivalry, 
the use of rewards and punishments, of set examinations and systems of promotion” 
(139). These competitive methods, the Utopians imply, ensure self-consciousness, fear 
of failure, and incapacity for many if not most students. Extrinsic rewards and punish-
ments undermine intrinsic motivation, transforming the curriculum into an unpleasant 
means, valuable only for what it can help one get. “So it was,” according to the Utopians, 
“that we had come to regard all study as simply a method of acquiring something, even 
if only useless or remote facts, and thought of learning and scholarship as the private 
possession of the resulting acquisition” (139). Alienated from learning in school, these 
children will be alienated from work as adults, forever acquiring and yet never gaining 
the prize. The motto of these schools, according to the Utopians, is that “man never is, 
but always is to be, blest” (139). This education, conditioned as it is by the acquisitive 
economic society, serves to perpetuate a society that measures achievement and success 
in purely economic terms, that inevitably has economic winners and losers, and that 
forces many to choose economic survival over vocational fulfillment.
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In contrast to the Utopian society, where this economic model has been 
abolished, those who emerge from this education are not likely to know what their 
particular capacities are or what they enjoy doing. Instead, insofar as they are in-
terested in their abilities, they value them for the economic benefits they may af-
ford them. In this way, they end up objectifying not only the curriculum, but also 
their own capacities. Their value, even to themselves, is largely economic in nature. 
utopianiSm in Education: an oBJEction to dEwEy’S ViSion
With the Utopians’ vision and critique in view, we can now consider whether 
this vision is realistic. In his own day, Dewey was accused of being utopian in his 
views about education and democracy—no doubt that is part of the joke behind 
his talk—and the Utopians turn out to be advocates of Dewey’s philosophy of edu-
cation. While Dewey’s stock has certainly risen since then, skepticism toward his 
educational vision is still relatively easy to find. For example, Alexander Sidorkin 
(2009) argues that Dewey’s vision is hopelessly utopian, precisely because it sys-
tematically ignores the role economic interest must play in motivating learning.4 
Dewey, in short, is utopian—read naïve—in his belief that learning can and should 
be motivated primarily by intrinsic interests rather than extrinsic economic ones.5 
Sidorkin’s view that economic interests must be used to motivate learning, since 
such interests motivate all work, is itself emblematic of the perspective Dewey saw 
as so corrosive to any education that would lead to social progress and reform. Con-
sequently, examining Sidorkin’s objection helps to clarify why Dewey thought the 
acquisitive economy represented such a danger both to education and to democracy. 
In particular, it will help us to see how Dewey’s understanding of the curriculum 
and of vocation underwrite his and the Utopians’ emphasis on developing intrinsic 
interests over and above extrinsic economic ones.
Sidorkin (2009) takes the principle attribute of utopias to be that they “ig-
nore people’s material interests and the limits inherent in any social institution” 
(191). He clarifies his notion of educational utopianism further this way: “Chil-
dren’s wishes and interests are important to Dewey, but their economic reasoning 
is simply invisible to him. Dewey assumes that we can expect children to perform 
any amount of work in school, if we only select and organize such work properly. 
This thinking leads to the utopian concept of education that simply does not take 
into account the limits of what schooling can and cannot deliver, and how much 
we can ask children to do” (191).
Sidorkin goes on to argue that we should recognize that “the sum total of 
children’s activities, including play and useful occupations, cannot generate the 
interest sufficient to ensure students’ motivation to learn the school curriculum, 
however it is reformed or redefined” (2009, 195). At base, Sidorkin rejects Dewey 
and his Utopians view that the intrinsic interest of the child should be what con-
nects the child to the curriculum and ultimately to his or her work as unrealistically 
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discounting the power of economic interest. In a sense, Sidorkin is right that Dewey 
seeks to minimize the role of economic interest in the classroom, but he fails to see 
why precisely Dewey does this, assuming it is simply naïveté.6
thE Economy and thE curriculum
Sidorkin’s critique rests upon the idea that the curriculum is a sort of commodity to 
be acquired by the student, and teaching a kind of economic transaction. As he con-
strues it, education is a kind of trade in which students agree to learn “boring stuff” 
not intrinsically interesting or particularly good for them in exchange for something 
they find valuable.7 He is skeptical of Dewey’s belief that there is “a way to hitch the 
school curriculum to the authentic interests of the child” (193), because he thinks 
the child’s interests only go so far; an interest in gardening does typically not imply 
one in soil chemistry.8 The solution to instruction, in his view, consists in providing 
the right economic incentives for doing the work of learning. “To make children 
work in schools,” he suggests, “we can force them or we can pay them; there isn’t 
really a third way” (193). This is why Sidorkin argues that we need “to pay students 
and their families for demonstrating learning that we deem important (198). This 
startling conclusion might make sense if one took the curriculum to be a commod-
ity (having value only as a means to economic gain) and instruction an economic 
transaction, but Dewey assumes neither and consequently insists on a third way.9
To understand why Dewey thinks children not only can, but must, develop 
intrinsic interests intense enough to carry them deep into the curriculum, it is nec-
essary to consider his own view of the curriculum. In The Child and the Curriculum 
(1902), Dewey addresses the problem of instruction; namely, how do we bring the 
content of the curriculum—the organized, formulated, crystallized body of all that 
we have learned about living in the world—into the living world of the child in the 
classroom? The curriculum, he argues, can’t be separated from the experiences that 
created it without making it inert and meaningless to the child in the classroom. 
It will appear to be “boring stuff,” and uninteresting to the degree that it retains 
its abstract shape. When curricular subject matter lacks “any organic connection 
with what the child has already seen, felt, and loved,” it will seem “purely formal 
and symbolic” to the child (1902, 31). For Dewey, the child and the curriculum rep-
resent limits of a single process, instruction being the means by which the child is 
brought deeper into the knowledge the curriculum represents. The instructor’s task 
is to provide concrete activities that connect the curriculum to the living child. He 
calls this “psychologizing” the curriculum, and contends that “if the subject mat-
ter . . . grows out of [the child’s] own past doings, thinkings, and sufferings, and 
grows into application in further achievements and receptivities, then no device or 
trick of method has to be resorted to in order to enlist “interest.” The psychologized 
is of interest—that is, it is placed in the whole of conscious life so that it shares the 
worth of that life” (1902, 35). Accordingly, such activities are not simply pedagogical 
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sugar-coating—they are the living curriculum. This is why he rejects, as artificial, 
means that make the subject matter interesting for reasons having no direct con-
nection to that subject matter, like the economic incentives Sidorkin suggests. To 
introduce such means would inhibit the connection necessary for the curriculum 
to come alive in the child.
In Dewey’s view, the chief task of education is to connect the relevant parts 
of the curriculum to the life of the child by engaging her present interests in con-
crete tasks.10 Accordingly, the point of bringing something like gardening into the 
school is to bring the abstract facts of the curriculum into the concrete experience 
of the child. As Dewey explains:
Gardening . . . need not be taught either for the sake of preparing future 
gardeners, or as an agreeable way of passing time. It affords an avenue of 
approach to knowledge of the place farming and horticulture have had in 
the history of the race and which they occupy in the present social orga-
nization. Carried on in an environment educationally controlled, they are 
means for making a study of the facts of growth, the chemistry of soil, the 
role of light, air, and moisture, injurious and helpful animal life, etc.  There 
is nothing in the elementary study of botany which cannot be introduced 
in a vital way in connection with caring for the growth of seeds. Instead 
of the subject matter belonging to a particular study called botany, it will 
then belong to life, and will find, moreover, its natural correlations with the 
facts of soil, animal life, and human relations. (1916, 200, emphasis mine)
For Dewey, the mind doesn’t stand aloof from activity; rather, it is unavoidably im-
mersed in the processes of the world. The curriculum is an idea—it is an abstrac-
tion of actual experience, like a map; the map represents actual wanderings, real 
expeditions (Dewey, 1902).11 For Dewey, these abstractions are literally meaning-
less if they are not embedded in their relation to human activity. Occupations like 
gardening, then, engage students in processes that embody the subject matter of 
the curriculum and arouse their interests, making them agents in the process, not 
mere spectators. The difference between the spectator and agent is in the sort of 
interest taken in an activity; the spectator, having no stake and no means to shape 
the outcome, is indifferent; the agent, having a deep concern over the foreseen ends, 
is eager to determine the best way to reach them. An occupation like gardening 
gives students the opportunity to be agents. Depending on age, this interest will 
take different forms. A five-year-old may simply want to see the wheat sprout and 
grow green, while an older child might want to see whether she can get her plants 
to produce more tomatoes this year than last. As Dewey suggests, over the course 
of years students “will perceive problems of interest which may be pursued for the 
sake of discovery, independent of the original direct interest in gardening” (200). 
To the question, “How, upon this basis, shall the child get the needed information; 
how shall he undergo the required discipline?” (1902, 59), Dewey, like the Uto-
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pians, responds that this is really the wrong sort of question. It assumes that the 
curriculum is simply information to be acquired and that discipline is something 
valuable in its own right. Instead, the curriculum is of use in the context of activi-
ties undertaken, and discipline is necessary only in the context of reaching desired 
ends. Like a map, it is useful only to those who want to go somewhere.12
Only children genuinely interested in something will develop the ability to 
inquire, to identify and solve problems, or, to return to the map metaphor, to chart 
new territories, by adding to the store of knowledge represented by the curriculum. 
Accordingly, the linchpin to Dewey’s educational vision is the development of the 
attitudes that make the child, and later the adult, keen to understand and energetic 
for the search. Intrinsic interest, then, isn’t simply a means for acquiring curricular 
content—it’s an end in its own right.
Sidorkin’s critique of Dewey’s use of occupations relies upon the mistaken 
view that they serve simply as means for delivering the content of the curriculum 
and that interest is only a pedagogical tool. Dewey’s concern to develop the ca-
pacity for intrinsic interest, however, goes much deeper than this. Ultimately, the 
ability to find deep interest in occupations—interest that embraces not only their 
curricular content, but also their social value—prepares the child to find mean-
ing, pleasure, and social significance in her work as an adult, as Dewey’s account 
of vocation makes clear.13
Vocation, dEmocracy, and utopia
For Dewey, a vocation is meaningful activity that matches one’s aptitude and 
interest to needs of the community of which one is a member. Thus, he writes in 
Democracy and Education, “To find out what one is fitted to do and to secure an 
opportunity to do it is the key to happiness. Nothing is more tragic than failure to 
discover one’s true happiness in life, or to find that one has drifted or been forced 
by circumstance into an uncongenial calling” (1916, 308). Ideally, then, schools as-
sist students in the discovery of “what they are good for,” helping them to identify 
and develop their capacities in a way that serves social needs and provides personal 
meaning (307–09). As we have seen, the schools of Utopia focus almost exclusively 
on this task. For them, the curriculum’s utility is found first in the discovery of 
the child’s specific potential, and second, in identifying the path best suited for 
developing it. The faith of both Dewey and his Utopians is that students afforded 
the opportunity to develop their potential in ways directly interesting to them will 
not only be personally happy, but also socially useful. Dewey and his Utopians see 
the acquisitive society as a threat to this task because it introduces pressures that 
alienate people from their true callings.
When identifying the greatest evil of the present state of society, Dewey (1916) 
points to “the fact that so many persons have callings which make no appeal to 
them, which are pursued simply for the money reward that accrues” (317). Such 
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people lack economic freedom in the sense that “their pursuits are fixed by accident 
and necessity of circumstances,” and, as a consequence, these pursuits “are not the 
normal expression of their own powers interacting with the needs and resources 
of the environment” (136). The implication is that work might spring from the 
normal expression of a person’s capacities in the context of purposes that engage 
her interests. Such work, while no doubt having economic value, would neither be 
determined by nor pursued primarily for the sake of its economic value; such work 
would be a “vocation” in Dewey’s sense. When economic factors force one into 
work that does not connect to personal interest, neither the heart nor the mind is 
deeply engaged.14 In view of these things, it is clear why fostering a sense of intrin-
sic interest is essential for schoolwork, and why Dewey explicitly rejects appeals to 
economic rewards of the sort Sidorkin (2009) recommends.
Schools provide a place in which occupations may, freed from the distorting 
effects of the economy, be pursued for their own sakes. Pursued in this way, they 
have enormous pedagogical value, since they bridge the great gap between the life 
of the child and the content of the curriculum. But their value extends beyond 
such academic concerns, since what is cultivated in the process of such an educa-
tion is the capacity to find and pursue one’s interests with devotion and discipline.
In Dewey’s view, helping students find their vocation involves not only the 
identification and development of their abilities, but also the fostering of their ap-
preciation of the ways their abilities connect to the needs of society. Part of what 
students gain from pursuing occupations in school—where they have been “freed 
from . . . the pressures of wage-earning” (1916, 200)—is the ability to grasp their 
social value or, as Dewey puts it, their connection to “fundamental common con-
cerns” (1916, 199).15 Engaging in occupations, then, raises awareness of social inter-
dependence. “An occupation,” in its most genuine sense, “balances the distinctive 
capacity of an individual with his social service” (1916, 308). In Dewey’s view, to the 
degree that people are able to engage in occupations of this sort, their work “makes 
the lives of others better worth living, and . . . makes the ties which bind persons 
together more perceptible [thereby breaking] down the barriers of distance between 
them” (1916, 316). Insofar as democracy itself is a mode of communicated experi-
ence measured by the number and quality of connections and shared interests, a 
society in which people have found their vocations would be thoroughly democratic 
in Dewey’s sense. In such a society, people would find intrinsic interest in their 
work uncoerced by extrinsic economic factors. In short, such a society would be 
very similar to the Utopia that stands on the other side of the acquisitive economy.
Though Dewey sees that such a society may seem a distant dream, noth-
ing ultimately stands in the way of its realization if the appropriate educational 
reforms are adopted, if basic dispositions of the next generation are altered. Such 
an alteration in attitude, he thinks, can only be accomplished by transforming the 
society of the school itself: “We may produce in schools a projection in type of the 
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society we should like to realize, and by forming minds into accord with it gradu-
ally modify the larger and more recalcitrant features of adult society” (1916, 317). 
Accordingly, the path to Utopia is thoroughly educational in nature, and, paradoxi-
cally, utopian education turns out to be the means by which this transformation is 
accomplished, not simply its result.
Both the vision for such social transformation and the faith in the educational 
means he advocates stem from Dewey’s faith in the ideal of radical democracy, an 
ideal that Richard Bernstein (2010) insists functions as “an end-in-view that can 
guide our actions here and now. It is an ideal that serves as a critical standard for 
evaluating the deficiencies of ‘really existing’ democracies and serves also as a guide 
for concrete action” (295). It functions, then, like Oscar Wilde’s map, like the cur-
riculum itself, locating us and equipping us for the never-ending “utopian task of 
shaping the future” (McKenna 2001, 101).16
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Dewey’s view of interest, see Mark E. Jonas, “Dewey’s Conception of Interest and Its Significance 
for Teaching Education,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 43, no. 2 (2011): 112–29.
10. John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916). As Dewey 
says, “The problem of instruction is . . . that of finding material which will engage a person 
in specific activities having an aim or purpose of moment or interest to him and dealing with 
things . . . as the condition for the attainment of ends” (1916, 132).
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11. John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1902). Dewey likens the curriculum to a map that organizes the many actual explorations peo-
ple have made into a coherent whole. In the hands of a guide, its use is locating the particular 
student, seeing where she is and what paths through the terrain will be most beneficial to her.
12. Even if interest is central to authentic learning, Sidorkin still finds Dewey’s use of 
occupations insufficient to motivate learning because students’ interests differ so widely. To 
think most children would have an interest in gardening is “naïve at best, ignorant at worst” 
(2009, 195). Dewey himself acknowledges as much, though he is perhaps more optimistic 
about children’s capacity for wonder and desire for understanding. Accordingly, Dewey 
(1916) writes: “In the concrete, the value of recognizing the dynamic place of interest in an 
educative development is that it leads to considering individual children in their specific 
capabilities, needs, and preferences.  One who recognizes the importance of interest will 
not assume that all minds work in the same way. . . . Attitudes and methods of approach 
and response vary with the specific appeal the same material makes, this appeal itself vary-
ing with difference of natural aptitude, of past experience, of plan of life, and so on” (130). 
The Utopian schools address this reality by providing a wide variety of contexts in which 
the facts of the curriculum can be encountered.  If a child has little interest in gardening but 
finds anything to do with vehicles fascinating, then it will be in that context that she comes 
to see the significance of mathematics, physics, chemistry, history, and so forth. Sidorkin’s 
concerns arise from schools as we know them; the Utopian schools allow for children to mix 
with younger and older peers and to choose from a wide variety of occupations. Sidorkin 
is clearly right that making everyone in the class garden may not arouse the sort of interest 
Dewey is talking about, but that is the fault of the structure of the school, not the notion of 
interest. This is Dewey’s point in saying that there are no schools in Utopia.
13. Jonas, “Dewey’s Conception of Interest,” 2011. Jonas’s excellent analysis of “interest” in 
Dewey helps to highlight this point. For Dewey, interest is a matter of identity and self-expression. 
Jonas writes, “Dewey believes that students become interested in a particular object . . . when they 
regard that object as so important that if they cannot apprehend it—absorb it, so to speak, through 
physical or psychical interaction—they will not be able to be the individuals they desire to be” (115). 
Interest, in this sense, clearly carries with it both motivation and meaning.
14. Dewey argues that this interest isn’t merely individual, but also social. An interest in 
gardening, for instance, arises from and answers to a larger social need, namely, the feeding 
of the hungry. It’s this value that strikes deep interest, and, paradoxically, it’s this value that 
is often obscured by the pressures of purely economic interest. As Dewey (1916) points out, 
“If the mass of mankind has usually found in its industrial occupations nothing but evils 
which had to be endured for the sake of maintaining existence, the fault is not in the occu-
pations, but in the conditions under which they are carried on” (200). The economy itself 
seems to play a significant role in creating these conditions, reducing work to a mere means 
for gaining money and maintaining existence.
15. Stemhagen and Pope (2012) make a similar point regarding the value of occupation-
centered or vocational schooling in Dewey’s philosophy of education (cf. 307–10).
16. I want to thank the two anonymous reviewers for exceptionally helpful feedback on this 
essay, which helped me to connect it to the larger discussion of utopian thinking and Dewey’s work.
E&C    EduCation and CulturE
80   ian t. E. dEwEESE-Boyd
BiBliography
Bernstein, R. “Dewey’s Vision of Radical Democracy.” In The Cambridge Companion to 
Dewey, edited by  Molly Cochran, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Dewey, John. The Child and the Curriculum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902.
———. Democracy and Education. New York: Macmillan, 1916.
———. “Dewey Outlines Utopian Schools.” The Later Works, 1925–1953 (vol. 9, 1933–
1934). Edited by J.A. Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989.
———. The School and Society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1900.
Jonas, Mark E. “Dewey’s Conception of Interest and its Significance for Teacher 
Education.” Educational Philosophy and Theory 43, no. 2 (2011): 112–29.
McKenna, E. The Task of Utopia: A Pragmatist and Feminist Perspective. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001.
Schor, Juliet. Born to Buy: The Commercialized Child and the New Consumer Culture. 
New York: Scribner, 2004.
Sidorkin, Alexander M. “John Dewey: A Case of Educational Utopianism.” In 
Philosophy of Education 2009, edited by Deborah Kerdeman, 191–99. Urbana, 
IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 2009.
Stemhagen, Kurt. “Dewey as Utopian: Labor Versus Leisure, Mass Media as 
Democratic Education, and the Future of Public Schooling.” In Philosophy of 
Education 2009, edited by Deborah Kerdeman, 200–03. Urbana, IL: Philosophy 
of Education Society, 2009.
Stemhagen, Kurt, and Nakia S. Pope. “Democracy, Capitalism, and Education: 
Reconsidering Dewey’s Failure to Address Economic Life.” In Philosophy 
of Education 2012, edited by Claudia W. Ruitenberg, 306–14. Urbana, IL: 
Philosophy of Education Society, 2012.
Wilde, Oscar. The Soul of Man Under Socialism and Selected Critical Prose. Edited 
by Linda Dowling. New York: Penguin, 2001.
Ian T. E. Deweese-Boyd is an associate professor in the Philosophy Department 
at Gordon College in Wenham, MA. Email: ian.deweese.boyd@gordon.edu
